The IEEE Std 802.15.6 is an international standard for wireless body area networks 1 (WBANs). It contains many aspects of communications, and also provides security services since 2 some communications in WBANs can carry sensitive information. In this standard, the password 3 authenticated association is a protocol for two participants to identify each other and establish a 4 new master key based on a pre-shared short password. However, recent researches show that this 5 protocol is vulnerable to several attacks. In this paper, we propose an improved protocol which can 6 resist all of these attacks. Moreover, the improved protocol alleviates computational burden on one 7 side of the two participants, the node, which is usually less powerful compared with the other side, hubs in WBANs. It provides strong security for communications which carry sensitive information.
given in the standard.
48
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.
49
Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is an anonymous key agreement protocol that allows two parties, each having an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel [16] . Suppose SK A and SK B are private keys of two communicating parties A and B respectively. SK A and SK B are random integers from the set {1, ..., r − 1}. The corresponding public keys PK A and PK B are computed as follows
where × denotes scalar multiplication of G by an integer. In the ECDH protocol, A and B exchange 50 their public keys and compute (x k , y k ) = SK A × PK B and (x k , y k ) = SK B × PK A respectively. The 51 shares key is x k , i.e. the X coordinate of the point. 
Password Authenticated Key Exchange

53
The password authenticated association protocol in IEEE 802.15.6 standard is a variation of 54 password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) [17] . A PAKE protocol uses a pre-shared password for 55 an authenticated key establishment. The password is usually short and easy for human to remember,
56
and is not stored directly in the memory of physical devices for security purpose, instead, it is input 57 by the users at the beginning of each run of the PAKE protocol. Symbol Meaning I identity of the initiator (i.e. the node) R identity of the responder (i.e. the hub) A identity of an adversary PW the pre-shared password K the temple Diffie-Hellman key used for computing CMAC MK the master key to be generated concatenation of bit strings SK I , PK I private and public keys of the initiator SK R , PK R private and public keys of the responder SK A , PK A private and public keys of the adversary N I a nonce generated by the initiator N R a nonce generated by the responder N A a nonce generated by the adversary Q(x) a function that maps a positive integer x to a point on the elliptic curve G base point in the elliptic curve × scalar multiplication RMB n (x) the n rightmost bits of x LMB n (x) the n leftmost bits of x
Symbols
59
The association protocol is initiated by the node to generate a shared master key with the hub 60 from a pre-shared password between them. We denote the node as the initiator and the hub as the 61 responder. Some other symbols used in this paper are summarized in Table 1 The initiator and the responder set up their private and public key as follows.
68
1. Initiator chooses a random SK I and computes the public key PK I = SK I × G.
69
2. Responder selects its private key SK R and computes PK R = SK R × G.
70
Master Key Generation
71
The initiator and the responder execute the following steps to generate a shared master key. 1. The initiator computes a password-scrambled public key
and sends it to the responder along with a nonce N I and the identities I and R:
2. After receiving M 1 , the responder sends the identities, a nonce and its public key back to the initiator:
The responder recovers PK I as follows
The initiator and the responder compute the Diffie-Hellman key respectively through
The responder computes a message authentication code
and then sends the initiator
The initiator verifies the received MAC 3 . If the verification succeeds, the initiator computes a message authentication code
and sends the responder
The responder verifies MAC 4 . If the verification succeed, both parties compute and activate their new master key as follows:
Security Problems
73
The standard protocol uses the password to hide the public key of the initiator through PK I =
74
PK I − Q(PW) in the first step, so that only the responder can recover PK I from PK I = PK I + Q(PW).
75
However, the protocol reveals PK I in M 4 of step 4, which means an eavesdropper who intercepts M 4 76 can acquire Q(PW). In this case, the password is no longer secret in following runs of the protocol. respectively, while the initiator and the responder think they have a shared master key. Figure   87 1 is a time-sequence diagram that illustrates the procedure of man-in-the middle attack against 88 the protocol.
89
• Off-line dictionary attack. [11, 12] show that a dictionary attacker who eavesdrops messages 90 between the initiator and the responder in a protocol run can obtain PK I and PK I and compute 91 Q(PW) from Q(PW) = PK I − PK I . Then Q(PW) can be used as a verifier and the attacker can 92 try probable PWs from a dictionary of most probable passwords and check them using Q(PW)
93
• Lack of forward secrecy. The author in [11, 12] illustrates that if SK I has been compromised by an 
The Modified Protocol
97
The authors in [10] propose a modified protocol to the standard protocol. Specifically, the 98 modified protocol is similar with the standard one except that it does not sent PK I in clear in M 4 .
99
This modification solves most security problems as we mentioned in Section 2.2, but it still fails to 100 provide forward secrecy. We will compare security and performance of the two protocols with those 101 of our new proposed protocol later in this paper. 
The Improved Protocol
103
The improved protocol assumes that PK and SK can be reused in each round of protocol. This 104 assumption is reasonable since in the improved protocol the temporary Diffie-Hellman key K is 105 derived from two random values chosen by the initiator and the responder respectively, rather than 106 the public and private keys of them. The improved protocol is described in detail as follows.
107
1. The initiator chooses a random value R I and computes
and
Then the initiator sends message M 1 to the responder.
The responder chooses a random value R R and computes
Then the responder sends message M 2 to the initiator
3. The responder recovers PK I as follows
The initiator computes the Diffie-Hellman key through
The responder computes K as follows
With the K the responder computes a message authentication code
The responder verifies MAC 4 . If the verification succeeds, both parties compute and activate their new master key as follows:
Security Analysis
108
In Section 2.2 we listed all the attacks to the standard protocol, and in this section, we will prove 109 the security of the improved protocol under all of these attack. 
where U A = R A + SK A and R A and N A are random values generated by A I .
2. After receiving M A1 , the responder chooses a random value R R and computes U R = R R + SK R and T R = U R × G. Then the responder replies A I with M 2 :
3. The responder recovers PK I and computes K = (U A × G − PK I ) × R R . Then the responder computes MAC 3 = CMAC 64 (RMB 128 (K), I R N A N R ) and sends the following message M 3 to A I :
4. At this step, A I needs to send the responder with MAC A4 which should be equivalent with
117
CMAC 64 (RMB 128 (K), R I N R N A ) so that it can pass the verification at the beginning of the 118 next step.
119
In step 4, in order to compute a valid MAC A4 , A I has to calculate K equals to but is established in the current run. Therefore, A has to compute we compare the evaluated cost of the improved protocol with the modified protocol and the standard 211 protocol in Table 2 .
212
From Table 2 we can see that the improved protocol reduces computation cost on the node, while 213 overall computation and communication cost does not increase. One time-consuming operation S is 
Experiments
217
The improved protocol contains the algorithm of CMAC and ECC key-generation (generating a 218 private key and using scalar multiplication to compute the public key). We test the runtime of these Table 3 and the results are summarized in Table 4 .
223
From Table 4 we can see the runtime of executing these algorithms is affordable for the node,
224
which means the improved protocol is suitable for WBANs applicaitons. 
Use Case
226
As described before, our improved protocol reduced the computational burden on one side of 227 communication. This is a significant strength for some applications in wireless sensor networks.
228
Here we describe a smart lock system that uses our improved protocol to generate a master key. The 229 specific system and the usage of the improved protocol is described as follows.
230
Smart Lock System
231
As is shown in Figure 2 , the smart lock system is consist of a lock which is a physical host 232 embedded with a computational device, and a phone which has installed a smart lock application.
233
The aim of this system is using this phone application to securely lock or unlock the lock. Obviously,
234
the computationally limited lock is the initiator and the relatively powerful phone is the responder.
235
The smart lock system includes the following three phases, and our protocol is involved in the first 236 phase. and sends the request (LOCK/UNLOCK) with the MAC to the lock. Here P and L denote 246 the identity of the phone and the lock, and Counter denotes the value of counter.
247
(2) The lock verifies the MAC. If the verification succeeds, the lock executes the request to 248 lock or unlock; else it does not execute the request or responds a failure message.
249
Analysis
250
The smart lock system is secure since the session key is kept secretly by the two participants.
251
An adversary can not request the system to lock or unlock, because they can not compute the correct
252
MAC without the session key. Therefore, the security of the session key is significant for the security 253 of the whole system. Our improved protocol provides secure generation for the master key which in 254 turn guarantees the security of the session key.
255
Additionally, the device embedded in the lock is a less powerful device compared with a normal 256 cell phone. Our password-based authenticated association protocol in the first phase reduces the 257 computational cost of the lock, which makes the smart lock system more practicable. authenticated association protocol is a scheme for the participants to generate a master key from a 299 pre-shared password.
300
Considering the asymmetric power of the two participants in WBANs, we propose an improved and efficiently through this protocol, and afterwards this is used for pairwise temporal key (PTK) creation, and the PTK is the key used in encryption and decryption process to provide authentication, 306 confidentiality and integrity for communication.
307
The improved protocol requires one scalar multiplication and two HMAC computations on the 308 nodes (i.e. the initiator). Since the computational costs of these algorithms are acceptable to devices 309 with limited power in WBANs, the improved protocol is suitable for applications in WBANs. 
